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candid and, at times, caustic. 
Tact has not always been his 
strong suit with the inevitable 
result that advancement was 
slow. If there are a few words 
that might best describe Forbes 
they would be "thoroughly 
dependable" or "natural leader." 
The reader is given early 
glimpses of these qualities from 
the author's childhood days in the 
Gaspe. There begins a 
tumultuous and adventurous life 
that shows no signs of slowing 
down except for the occasional 
pause to cope with tragedy or to 
catch much-needed breath before 
resuming a sometimes 
hyperactive pace. The result is a 
book that bristles with action, 
indignation, Rabelaisian humour, 
warmth, contempt ... all marks of 
a man at once blessed and 
damned with perhaps an 
overabundance of talent and 
energy. 
How many men are honest 
enough to admit that theirs has 
been a life plagued by alcoholism? 
Charly is candid enough in this 
regard and the mark of the man 
is that he was able, despite this 
problem, to accomplish the many 
things he did. But he is honest 
enough to hint at how much more 
could have been done without the 
bottle and the reader is made to 
feel that a large part of his 
problem is pride. This pride 
coupled with fierce independence 
made enemies for Charly which 
probably accounts for his having 
ended his active military career 
as a major. His one-time nemesis, 
Jacques Dextraze, cared enough 
for him to try to get Forbes to stop 
drinking. He pointed out the vast 
potential of the man but the 
touchy relationship between the 
two is worth the read in itself and 
Forbes is honest enough to 
swallow his pride and admit the 
considerable leadership qualities 
of the man many of us called "Kid 
28." 
It would be safe to say that 
for every enemy Charly made in 
the service, there were many 
more friends. Naturally they were 
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similar types ... men who had 
proven themselves in battle such 
as Louis Rend Drapeau with his 
two well deserved DCMs or Harry 
Pope or Guy de Merlis, men who 
had little or no use for the 
"niceties" aptly called chicken 
shit. But the most significant 
mark of the man as leader is the 
way he is seen by those he leads. 
Charly Forbes very simply was 
venerated by his men. His total 
concern in the field was their 
welfare and this he demonstrated 
from the very beginning of his 
soldier's life to the point where 
promotion, family and everything 
else became secondary. 
Charly's marital difficulties 
are diplomatically handled and 
nowhere does he indulge in 
recrimination. There is also 
regret at his not having managed 
such matters with more tact but 
the call to duty and the need to 
serve played an inordinate role in 
his life. The price he paid was 
high. The strongest element in the 
book remains Forbes' total and 
accurate recall of the fierceness 
and confusion of battle whether 
it was in Normandy, at Walcheren 
or in those hectic four days in 
Korea in November 1951. Here is 
a very close approximation to the 
descriptions of combat and its 
effects as depicted by Mowat in 
And No Birds Sang. In some 
ways, Forbes outdoes Mowat for 
he avoids inventiveness of any 
kind for effect ... the price Mowat 
admits he pays for being a writer. 
From the shaky start as a 
cadet at RMC when he first 
displayed his independence by 
refusing to sing "God Save the 
King" while insistently repeating 
the words of "0 Canada" as his 
national anthem in the company 
of another recalcitrant, Philippe 
Rousseau (later killed with his 
brother in the 1st Canadian 
Parachute Battalion) through to 
the day he is declared redundant 
by a budget conscious 
government, Forbes has been his 
own man and hundreds have 
shaken their heads in amazement 
and admiration at his skills as a 
leader and his joie de vivre as a 
man. 
The photos in this book 
excellently illustrate the closeness 
that existed between Charly and 
his comrades-in-arms. But the 
book's saving grace is its can dour. 
Whether Charly is reflecting upon 
conscription, the criminality of 
the Dieppe raid, battle 
exhaustion, the death of a platoon 
sergeant, the devoted Maisie 
padre, Marchand, the 
incompetence of some officers, 
the Yank bug-out on 355 or his 
own shortcomings ... what the 
reader comes away with is a 
lasting impression of having met 
an extraordinary man. 
The book ends with 
anecdotes ranging from the comic 
to the tragic and the last notes are 
a humble tribute to his comrades, 
especially the junior officers with 
whom he served. As I close, one 
word keeps buzzing insistently in 
my head: compassion. It is this 
quality that permeates Charly 
Forbes' life-compassion for those 
who have had to put up with the 
arrogance, stupidity and 
incompetence too frequently the 
companions of power. 
A translation of this re-edited 
book would be a very good thing. 
Gil Drolet 
* * * * * 
The Battle of the 
Generals 
Martin Blumenson. The Battle of 
the Generals: The Untold Story 
of the Falaise Pocket - The 
Campaign that Should have won 
World War II. New York: William 
Morrow and Company, 1993. 
pp.288. $29.95. 
Martin Blumenson writes that the Allies' failure to close the 
"Falaise pocket" was the result of 
three basic conditions of the 
Allied campaign: the undue 
weight of the invasion plan, the 
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tensions within the coalition, 
and the less than adequate 
abilities of the leaders at the top. 
(p.23) Ignoring for the moment 
that the proximity of large 
numbers of trigger-happy 
Germans may have had an 
impact on the course of the 
battle and the decisions taken by 
the high command, let me 
quickly summarize Blumenson's 
argument. Over a third of the 
book is devoted to context: 
outlining the major personalities 
involved, the Allied coalition from 
the top down (including lengthy 
discussions on Roosevelt and 
Churchill), the struggle for 
dominance within the alliance, 
the German defences and 
strategic plans as well as a 
summary of the course of war 
from 1939. This, he believes, is 
the necessary pretext for a series 
of errors that culminated in the 
campaign that. according to the 
title, should have "won the war." 
His points follow in 
succession. The emphasis on 
moving into Germany as rapidly 
as possible instead of destroying 
the German forces in Normandy 
and the continued dispatch of 
formations to liberate Brittany 
are two examples used to 
illustrate the Allies' dependence 
on their preconceived plans and 
that no one at the top firmly 
grasped the reigns. Eisenhower, 
Montgomery and Bradley do not 
come off well in this account; 
Bradley, in particular, is 
Blumenson's whipping horse: 
insecure and ambivalent. While 
this is not new, the author's 
criticisms of Bradley have, in the 
past, been tempered with a 
recognition of the difficulties he 
faced. Patton emerges as the hero 
in this account and the 
unrecognized saviour of Allied 
fortunes. "No wonder Patton," he 
writes, "dreamed of being the 
Supreme Commander. He would 
take absolute hold of the 
operations and surround and 
destroy all the Germans in 
Normandy with resolution and 
finality." (p.223) Blumenson 
speculates that an Eisenhower-
Montgomery-Patton combination 
would have been more successful; 
his own quotes from Patton's 
correspondence make one 
wonder whether as an equal he 
would only have been as 
obnoxious to these men's faces as 
he was in his diary. 
Written from the US 
perspective, the Canadians are, of 
course, given short shrift, 
although they can not escape the 
"everyone was to blame" tone of 
the book. Worse, he uses the 
unsubstantiated view that 
"residual tensions between" 
Crerar and Simonds" (p.183) 
influenced the Canadian military 
fortunes during this period. 
Although it fits nicely with his 
theme, it isn't true. Neither is his 
grasp of the Canadian part in the 
battle complete. He implies, for 
example, that it was after the 
pause on the morning of 8th, and 
"to get the endeavour (Totalize) 
started again" that Simonds 
ordered a second bombardment 
and the two inexperienced 
armoured divisions forward. 
(p.185) 
Does any of this story sound 
vaguely familiar? It should; this 
is hardly an untold story. 
Blumenson has himself written 
two direct accounts of the battle 
("General Bradley's Decision at 
Argentan" in Command 
Decisions and Breakout and 
Pursuit, two volumes of the 
Official History of the United 
States Army in World War II) and 
dealt with it in other works. 
Blumenson's previous efforts 
have not focused on 
personalities; rather, he limited 
himself to examining the 
opera tiona! possibilities and 
restrictions. He was also more 
balanced in his conclusions. His 
ire has risen with new evidence 
that more Germans escaped than 
he previously estimated. 
Could the battle have won the 
war? No one can say for sure; a 
victory would certainly not have 
alleviated the Allies' supply 
problems. Indeed, in previous 
battles the Germans had 
sustained greater losses and not 
crumbled; they were still fighting 
while the Russians pounded the 
bunkers in Berlin. Clearly, on the 
Allied side there was waffling at 
the top with regards to objectives 
and poor decisions (Bradley's 
order to Patton not to go on to 
Falaise and beyond to meet the 
Canadians) but clearly they were 
also wary of German 
counterattacks. The central point 
seems that with the fog of war, no 
one was sure whether the 
Germans were still in the pocket; 
as a result they wavered on 
whether to slam the door shut or 
focus on the Seine or both. 
Blumenson's account smacks far 
too much of hindsight. Similarly, 
the problem with examining the 
failures of the Allies and 
proposing better solutions is that 
it presumes the Germans would 
have gone along with the altemate 
plans proposed, stopped trying to 
fight their way out and given up. 
Nevertheless, the book is a good 
read and summarizes a lot of 
material, painting deft portraits 
of the Allied commanders; its 
story isn't untold but Blumenson 
tells it better than some. 
Paul Dickson 
University of Guelph 
* * * * * 
Merry Hearts Make 
Light Days 
Donald Graves, ed. Merry Hearts 
Make Light Days. The War of 
1812 Journal of Lieutenant John 
Le Couteur, 1 04th Foot. 
I n May of 1812 the brig Ann headed westward from England 
into the Atlantic carrying a 
number of British army officers 
towards Canada. The vessel 
encountered its first gale while 
they were at dinner, and a 17-
year-old lieutenant described the 
resulting chaos: "The old brig was 
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